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Abstract 
The number and importance of private companies in the United 
States indicates that reliable quality of financial accounting reports 
(QFAR) of private companies that are useful for decision making 
is likely to be important for economic growth.  Most previous 
research examining QFAR addressed earnings management among 
publicly-traded companies.  This study extends prior literature by 
examining whether abnormal production of public and private 
companies is impacted by (i) assurance type (PCAOB-audit, 
GAAS-audit, and SSARS-Review), (ii) tax status (separately taxed 
versus pass-through entity) of private companies, and (iii) relative 
size. An audit of financial statements provides a high degree of 
assurance, whereas a review provides limited assurance. Due to 
data limitations with our private company sample, this study 
focuses on earnings management through abnormal production by 
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manufacturing companies.  When examining companies that just 
met the benchmark of prior years' earnings or zero earnings we 
found positive abnormal production for publicly traded companies 
and privately held audited-taxable companies, but not for other 
privately held companies.  Not identified in previous studies, we 
find that abnormal production of similarly sized public companies 
and private companies differ.  Our findings provide evidence 
relevant to the Big GAAP/Little GAAP debate and that one set of 
accounting standards may not satisfy all public and private 
company financial statement users. Also, results of this study 
support the recommendations of the Financial Accounting 
Foundation’s Blue Ribbon Panel’s Report for establishing a 
separate private company standards board to help ensure 
appropriate modifications to GAAP. 
 
Acknowledgement: We thank the University of Louisville, 
College of Business for a Summer Research Grant to 
support this project. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Privately-owned enterprises have traditionally been an 
important part of the U.S. economy.  According to the U.S. Small 
Business Administration (2013a, 2013b), privately owned 
companies produced 46% of private nonfarm U.S. gross domestic 
product in 2008 and private sector businesses with less than 500 
employees accounted for 56% of total employment in 2011.  
Consequently, reliable financial statements for small and medium 
sized businesses would provide many stakeholders with 
information with which to make decisions that collectively have a 
large impact on the U.S. economy. 
The Financial Accounting Foundation's (2011) Blue Ribbon 
Panel (BRP) on Standard Setting for Private Companies reported 
that, in 2008, to promote investor protection the SEC only required 
financial reporting by about 14,000 public companies.  In contrast, 
Journal of Accounting, Ethics & Public Policy 
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about 28 million private companies in the U.S. operate without 
formal government guidance relating to the quality and types of 
information to be provided to protect investors. However, to assist 
preparers and users of financial information related to private 
companies, accounting regulators should recognize that the nature 
and extent of private company accounting information required 
and preferred could substantially differ from that required from 
public companies.  
In fact, the AICPA’s (2013) task force on its Financial 
Reporting Framework for Small-and-Medium Sized Entities (FRF-
SME) noted differences in recognition and measurement of 
transactions between public and private companies.    The task 
force on FRF-SME also pointed out differences including:   (1) 
SMEs generally have more control over to whom they give their 
financial statements and key financial statement users have direct 
accesses to the entity’s management, and (2) SME financial 
statement users may have greater interest in cash flows, liquidity, 
statement of financial position, and interest coverage.   The FRF-
SME is a non-GAAP framework, designed to provide financial 
information that would be relevant, efficient, simple, and optional 
for entities to use with no official or authoritative status (Durak 
2013).  The FRF-SME task force recognized that providing 
reliable, relevant and cost-effective financial accounting reports to 
users of information from small and medium sized private 
companies is important for the growth of private companies and 
the economy.  
Most previous research examining the quality of financial 
accounting reports (QFAR) addressed earnings management 
among publicly-traded companies (e.g., Ching et al. 2006; Klein 
2002; Badertscher 2011; Balsam et al. 2002; Jo and Kim 2007) and 
the audit-related issues arising from this behavior (Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al. 2008; Cohen et al. 2008; Doyle et al. 2007; Francis 
and Krishnan 1999).  A few recent studies have examined QFAR 
of privately owned companies including Givoly et al. (2010), Hope 
et al. (2013), and Kvaal et al. (2012).   
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Like Hope et al. (2013), we compare public and private 
company financial information to assess the quality of accounting 
reports of privately-held companies.    We extend their study by 
investigating the impact of independent assurance services 
(audited versus reviewed) and tax status (separately taxed versus 
pass-through entity) on earnings management through production 
activities in the financial statements of privately-held 
manufacturing companies.  
Gunny (2010) examined four types of real activities 
management (RAM) using public companies of all sizes from a 
variety of industries.  Our private company database, Sageworks, 
contains much less consistent data for included observations than 
that available for public companies (in COMPUSTAT), except 
data relating to inventory. Consequently, we focus on one type of 
RAM examined by Gunny (2010), inventory and production 
decisions used in manufacturing industries.  
Only manufacturers can substantially increase or decrease 
reported income by adjusting work in process and finished goods 
inventories to time the expensing of fixed manufacturing costs.  
Also, unlike public companies, most private companies 
(particularly those obtaining review services) are likely to be 
relatively small.  Consequently, to compare public and private 
companies' production activities in a focused manner, we limit 
public companies included in our sample to manufacturers with 
sales in the same range as that of private companies included in the 
sample, from $1 million to $150 million. 
Real earnings management behavior has been examined 
with respect to the demand and opportunistic behavior hypotheses 
(Givoly et al. 2010; Hope et al. 2013).  The "demand" hypothesis 
predicts that public company shareholders and creditors will 
demand higher quality reporting than that demanded of private 
companies.  The "opportunistic behavior" hypothesis expects 
public company managers to have more incentive to manage 
earnings than private company managers.  These hypotheses could 
have a more complex relation to earnings management behavior in 
Journal of Accounting, Ethics & Public Policy 
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private companies because, for example, private companies have 
the option to have their financial statements audited or reviewed to 
provide, respectively, a high degree or limited assurance. We did 
not examine private companies with compiled or self-prepared 
financial statements not covered by independent assurance 
services.  
Companies engage independent accountants to provide 
their reports based on audit, review, or compilation of financial 
statements. Audit reports provide a high degree of assurance 
regarding the reliability of financial statements; review reports 
provide limited assurance; and compilation reports do not provide 
any assurance. In audits, whether under PCAOB auditing standards 
for the audits of public companies or Generally Accepted Auditing 
Standards (GAAS) for the audits of private companies, auditors are 
required to gather sufficient appropriate audit evidence in support 
of their audit report. Review engagement reports, according to the 
Statements on Standards for Accounting and Review Services 
(SSARS) provide limited assurance for which the scope of work 
undertaken by independent accountants is relatively narrower than 
the scope of work undertaken in audits. In compilation 
engagements, independent accountants merely compile financial 
statements based on data provided by management. In this paper 
we consider only audits and review services. 
To obtain more reliable information for decision making, 
investors are more likely to demand that managers/owners engage 
independent accountants to audit rather than review their 
companies’ financial statements. Also, the motivation for 
managing production activities to minimize overall income taxes 
differs between privately-owned taxable and pass-through 
companies.  Thus, in private companies, opportunistic behavior 
could lead to either understating or overstating income due to 
varying owner objectives.   
Our study extends prior literature on earnings management 
by manufacturing companies by following the approach for 
measuring abnormal production used by Gunny (2010) to examine 
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whether (i) assurance type (PCAOB-audit, GAAS-audit, and 
Review) covering financial statements prepared according to 
GAAP affects the abnormal production of public and private 
companies, (ii) whether tax status (separately taxed versus pass-
through entity) of private companies influences their abnormal 
production, and (iii) whether relative size affects the abnormal 
production of public and private companies.  We find overall, that 
publicly traded companies tend to have significantly negative 
abnormal production, which would decrease reported income. 
Analysis of different groups of private companies revealed that 
audited and separately taxed companies exhibit a significantly 
positive abnormal production, which would increase reported 
income.  
An interesting finding of our analysis that has not been 
identified in previous studies is that abnormal production of public 
companies and private companies differ based on their relative 
size.  Within our sample of companies with sales between $1 
million and $150 million, public companies in the lowest size 
quintile based on sales exhibit relatively higher abnormal 
production (increasing reported income) while those in the highest 
sales quintile exhibit relatively lower abnormal production 
(decreasing reported income). In contrast, all private companies 
except companies that are audited-taxed showed an opposite effect 
in that the companies in the lowest size quintile based on sales 
exhibit negative abnormal production while those in the highest 
sales quintile exhibit positive abnormal production. The results 
suggest that relatively larger public manufacturing companies 
report more conservatively than smaller ones, possibly because 
they are subjected to closer audit scrutiny due to higher litigation 
risk and the possibility of PCAOB inspection of larger audits.   
For privately-owned companies, relative size does not 
appear to impact the abnormal production of audited-taxable 
companies.  This could result from conflicting goals faced by 
private taxable companies of (1) showing good financial results for 
lenders and other external users, and (2) minimizing income tax 
Journal of Accounting, Ethics & Public Policy 
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liability. Results for the private audited pass-through, reviewed 
taxable, and reviewed pass-through company groups suggest that 
the relatively larger of these companies likely have relatively 
larger abnormal production while the relatively smaller of these 
companies have relatively lower abnormal production. The desire 
to show good financial results for lenders and other external users 
could explain why relatively larger private companies exhibit 
positive abnormal production. Relatively smaller private 
companies are more likely to be owner managed and likely more 
highly motivated to reduce tax liability by reducing income 
reported for income tax purposes. (We could not verify this 
potential difference because Sageworks database does not contain 
ownership-and management-related data).  These results appear to 
indicate that accounting information generated by both public and 
private companies of all sizes based on the one-GAAP framework 
might not satisfy small business user needs; thus supporting the 
need for an alternative non-GAAP framework as provided by the 
AICPA (2013) FRF-SME task force report. 
To identify companies most likely to engage in earnings 
management, like (Gunny 2010), we included an indicator variable 
(BENCH) for companies that just met the benchmark of prior 
years' earnings or zero earnings in regression analyses.  This 
variable was significantly positive for publicly traded companies 
and privately held audited-taxable companies.  These results 
provide evidence that public and private audited-taxable 
manufacturing companies most likely to want to manage earnings 
upwards, appear to indeed manage production and inventory 
decisions. These companies may manage earnings through 
production and inventory decisions because auditors are more 
likely to identify manipulation of accruals than manipulation of 
production and inventory levels.  In contrast, companies that are 
reviewed might find managing other accruals more convenient or 
easier than managing production activities to manage earnings.        
We proceed in section II by discussing related literature 
which provides a context for our study and theoretical support for 
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our hypotheses.  Section III provides a description of the data and 
the results of the empirical analysis in examining the hypotheses.  
Section IV discusses the limitations of the study, and offers 
suggestions for further research.  We conclude in Section V with a 
summary of results and a discussion of the implications of the 
findings.  
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
Earnings management is defined as when managers use 
judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to 
alter reported data to influence contractual outcomes that depend 
on reported accounting information (Healy and Wahlen 1999, 6). 
Prevalent earnings management has been found in publicly-traded 
companies (e.g. Fields et al. 2001; Healy and Wahlen 1999; 
Kothari et al. 2005; Roychowdhury 2006; Zhao et al. 2012).  
Earnings management can occur through accruals management or 
real activities management, such as managing production and 
inventory levels.   
Roychowdhury (2006, 337) defines real activities 
(transactions) management as “actions that deviate from normal 
business practices, undertaken with the primary objective to 
mislead certain stakeholders into believing that earnings 
benchmarks have been met in the normal course of operations”.  
For example, management can deviate from normal operations by: 
reducing research and development expenditures, reducing selling, 
general, and administrative expenses (SG&A), deferring write-off 
of fixed costs, increasing or decreasing production and inventory 
levels to decrease or increase costs of goods sold, suspending 
business development activities to lower revenue, and offering 
unusual price discounts at the end of a period to increase sales.   
All of these actions would impact reported earnings in the 
short term.  Real activities management differs from accruals 
management because real activities have direct cash flow 
Journal of Accounting, Ethics & Public Policy 
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consequences; real activities management negatively affects future 
operating performance (Gunny 2010; Zhao et al. 2012).  Several 
studies have found activities management to be associated with 
earnings management in publicly-traded companies (e.g. Cohen et 
al. 2008; Cohen et al. 2010; Eldenburg et al. 2011; Gunny 2010; 
Roychowdhury 2006; Thomas and Zhang 2002; Zhao et al. 2012).  
Gunny (2010) found that real activities management is associated 
with companies just meeting their earnings benchmarks.   
As mentioned previously, the Sageworks data was not 
complete for many observations. Consequently, constructing real 
earnings management variables to obtain a sufficient sample size 
of private companies was difficult. However, most Sageworks 
manufacturing observations did report production and inventory 
data. Due to data limitations, we focused on examining production 
and inventory levels of public and private manufacturing 
companies to determine the impact of assurance-type on real 
activities management.  In our sample we included only 
manufacturing companies because only manufacturing companies 
could effectively manage earnings through their production and 
inventory decisions.   
 
Regulations and Preferences in Managing Accruals and 
Activities 
 
As stated in the introduction, differences in real earnings 
management between private and public companies have been 
examined based on the demand and opportunistic behavior 
hypotheses (Givoly et al. 2010; Hope et al. 2013).  Public company 
shareholders and creditors can "demand" higher quality reporting 
than that demanded of private companies.  Public companies 
experience higher agency costs than private companies due to, for 
example, more greatly dispersed ownership of public companies 
and greater separation between managers and owners of public 
companies (Hope et al. 2013).  Conversely, public company 
managers have more incentive to engage in "opportunistic 
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behavior" to manage earnings than private company managers.  
Lower relative ownership of the company by managers of public 
companies than private companies could lead public company 
managers to a short-term focus on executive compensation tied to 
reported earnings such as bonuses and stock options (Hope et al. 
2013).   
Regulation may also impact how much firms manage 
earnings, and what type of earnings management they use.  Public 
trading of company shares on stock markets have been found to 
have a negative impact on accounting quality (Beatty et al. 2002). 
However, Ewert & Wagenhofer (2005) found that tightening 
accounting standards (regulations) makes the use of accrual 
management more difficult, resulting in an increase in real 
activities management. Consistent with this, Cohen et al. (2008) 
found that real activities management increased after 
implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2004. SOX, 
by establishing the PCAOB to monitor the accounting industry, 
tightened accounting regulations to improve the quality of 
financial accounting reports. This additional regulation appears to 
have restricted the use of accrual management, forcing companies 
to use real activities management to manage earnings. 
Earnings management might improve communication of 
private information by lessening the information asymmetry 
between the management and external investors (efficient earnings 
management) or could maximize benefits to management by 
increasing the price of the shares managers hold in the company 
(opportunistic earnings management) (Balsam et al. 2002; 
Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; 
Cheng and Warfield 2005).  Managers of public companies are 
frequently faced with ethical dilemmas between their obligation to 
provide reliable and fair QFAR to stakeholders, and their own 
short-term personal interest.   
To maximize share price, management in publicly-traded 
companies prefer to report steadily increasing earnings and avoid 
reporting losses (Roychowdhury 2006).   Managers of publicly-
Journal of Accounting, Ethics & Public Policy 
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traded companies have an incentive to manage earnings to meet 
certain milestones and forecasts to secure their jobs (DeFond and 
Park 1997) and satisfy shareholders, creditors, and analysts (Daniel 
et al. 2008; Graham et al. 2005; Trueman and Titman 1988; 
Tucker and Zarowin 2006).  Public company managers may also 
desire to manipulate/manage earnings to earn/increase bonuses 
and/or increase the value of stock/options they own.  
Cohen & Zarowin (2010), focusing their analysis around 
seasoned equity offerings, found that companies use both accrual 
and real activities-based earnings management to manipulate 
earnings.  When examining the tradeoffs between accrual and real 
activities management, Zang's (2012) study suggests that managers 
treat the two strategies as substitutes to manage earnings; 
managers first consider management of real activities before 
considering accruals management. Likewise, managers exhibit a 
greater preference to manage earnings through real activities 
management than through accrual management (Bruns and 
Merchant 1990; Graham et al. 2005) because:  (1) accrual 
management is more likely to draw the attention of auditors while 
increasing or decreasing inventory levels through adjusting 
production is a management decision and is not likely to be 
subjected to the same level of audit scrutiny as those for accruals 
management (Roychowdhury 2006), (2) managers perceive 
earnings management through real activities management as more 
ethical than accruals management (Bruns and Merchant 1990), and 
(3) a recent study indicates that investors perceive accruals-based 
earnings management a more serious violation of their trust in 
managers than real earnings management  (Hewitt et al. 2013).   
 
Public vs. Private Companies and Inventory Management 
(Abnormal Production) 
 
A significant number of studies address earnings 
management through production and inventory levels using data 
sets consisting of publicly-traded companies (Badertscher 2011; 
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Chien et al. 2011; Gunny 2010; Cohen and Zarowin 2010; Bartov 
and Cohen 2009; Cohen et al. 2008; Roychowdhury 2006; Thomas 
and Zhang 2002).  However, only recently has real activities 
management research focused on privately-held companies (Asker 
et al. 2011; Bharat et al. 2010; Brav 2009; Edgerton 2012; Gao et 
al. 2010; Michaely and Roberts 2012; Minnis 2011; Saunders and 
Steffen 2011; Sheen 2009).  
For publicly-traded companies, earnings management has 
been found to be related to: corporate governance, valuation 
issues, disclosure frequency, and stock ownership characteristics.  
However, compared to publicly-traded companies, private 
companies do not have: the same reporting requirements, the same 
level of regulations, same type of ownership structure or the same 
level of external scrutiny. Consequently, corporate governance, 
valuation issues, disclosure frequency, and stock ownership 
characteristics may impact earnings management by private 
companies differently or not at all.   
Also, other factors might motivate private companies to 
manage their earnings, such as to minimize overall income taxes 
(e.g. Beatty and Harris 1999).  Likewise, the transparency of 
information and goals of investors/owners could influence whether 
a firm manages earnings. Further, the use of GAAP as proscribed 
by the FASB and PCAOB is likely to be complex and costly to 
private companies leading some private companies to prepare 
statements that depart from standards not considered useful.         
Recent research has addressed several issues with private 
companies.  Some of this research has empirically tested 
differences between private and publicly-traded companies.  For 
example, in examining public and private banks, Beatty & Harris 
(1999) argued that private companies manage earnings less 
aggressively because they have less information asymmetry with 
owners and have a greater proportion of long-run investors. Some 
studies comparing publicly and privately owned companies used 
limited samples of U.S. companies. Givoly et al. (2010), analyzed 
a sample of 531 private equity firms with 2519 firm-year 
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observations and found that private equity firms have higher 
quality accruals and a lower propensity to manage income than 
public equity firms. Gao et al. (2010) used public and private 
companies in the CapitalIQ database to compare CEO 
compensation.  They found that public-company CEO pay was 
sensitive to measures such as stock prices and profitability while 
CEO pay in private companies was not.   
Asker et al. (2011) obtained the Sageworks data base that 
provided a large sample of private companies to compare to 
publicly-traded companies.  All data in their sample covered from 
2002 to 2007.  They matched companies from Sageworks and 
COMPUSTAT on size and industry and developed a sample to 
contain 4,975 observations from each data set, coming from 1,666 
and 620 separate publicly-traded and private companies, 
respectively.  They found that publicly-traded companies invested 
considerably less and were less responsive to changes in 
investment opportunities than were private companies.  These 
results were especially pronounced in industries where earnings 
announcements impacted stock prices the most.  Asker et al. 
(2011) concluded that an agency problem might explain the 
differences in investment behavior between publicly-traded and 
private companies; public company managers' investment 
decisions reflect a focus on short-term results.   
Hope et al. (2013) using a sample of 73,596 observations of 
public and private firms, found that, on average, public firms have 
higher accrual quality and report more conservatively, which is 
consistent with the “demand” (for higher quality information) 
effect dominating the “opportunistic behavior” effect. Their study 
did not examine the effects of different tax statuses (taxable and 
pass-through) and/or the impact of different assurance levels 
(audits and review) on QFAR. Further, their sample included 
numerous industries.  Since our study focuses on the effects of 
production and inventory activities on QFAR under different 
assurance types and tax statuses, our analyses include 
manufacturing companies only.   
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Results from the studies cited, and the Blue Ribbon Panel’s 
report (2011) would suggest private and publicly-traded companies 
differ in many ways. One set of accounting standards may not 
allow users to adequately evaluate the differences between public 
and private companies. Consequently, examining whether 
privately-held companies exhibit similar abnormal production 
patterns as those found in publicly-traded companies becomes 
important.   
 
Level of Assurance 
The type of assurance (e.g., PCAOB-audit, GAAS-audit or 
SSARS-review) is likely to affect the quality of financial 
statements of the company.  Under the “opportunistic behavior” 
hypothesis, public company managers generally have more 
incentive to manage earnings than privately-held company 
managers (e.g., Givoly 2010).  However, as Hope et al. (2013) 
found, the demand for higher quality information, including 
stricter regulations governing public companies, likely restricts 
public company practices that manage earnings more so than 
private company managers. For example, auditors of publicly-
traded companies are subject to more regulatory oversight than 
auditors of private companies.  
Audits of public companies are subject to periodic PCAOB 
inspection.  The PCAOB can impose sanctions for violations of 
auditing standards (such as by suspending audit firm and/or 
associated auditors from auditing public companies, and/or by 
imposing monetary penalty which in some cases could exceed 
$2,000,000).1  Further, auditors of public companies are likely 
exposed to higher levels of litigation and adverse publicity risk 
than auditors of private companies in the event of an audit failure.  
                                                 
1 See PCAOB’s Settled Disciplinary Orders, 
http://pcaobus.org/Enforcement/Decisions/Pages/default.aspx 
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Consequently, regulatory and audit scrutiny may not allow 
management of public companies the same level of opportunity to 
manage earnings as private company managers.  
Only privately owned companies can choose among 
different levels of assurance associated with their financial 
statements.  We limited our analysis to private companies whose 
financial statements were either audited or reviewed by certified 
public accountants; private companies with compiled or self-
prepared financial statements not covered by independent 
assurance services were not included in our sample. Independent 
accountants engaged to review financial statements only offer a 
limited negative assurance by stating that they are not aware of any 
material modifications that should be made to the financial 
statements for the statements to be in accordance with GAAP 
(AICPA 2009).  In contrast, when issuing a clean audit opinion, 
auditors are required to provide a high degree of assurance that 
financial statements are free of material misstatements (including 
those that may result from production management) and are 
presented in accordance with GAAP.  In addition to complying 
with GAAS, independent auditors face a greater level of litigation 
risk than the risk-level faced by independent accountants engaged 
to review financial statements. 
Consequently, managers of companies using review 
services may likely find it easier to manage production activities 
compared to those using audit services.  However, this does not 
necessarily mean that reviewed financial statements will be 
unreliable. The reliability of reviewed financial statements 
depends on the tone at the top and is likely to be comparable to 
those of audited financial statements when management insists on 
tightly controlled financial reporting.   
Further, the increase in costs to provide potentially 
irrelevant information from limited accounting resources has led 
some private companies to prepare financial statements containing 
departures from GAAP, which users are willing to accept.  The 
Blue Ribbon Panel (BRP) questioned whether the aspects of U.S. 
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GAAP, which might not be relevant to many users, are truly 
"generally accepted" (Hilmi et al. 2012).  Further, in many 
situations, preparing overly complex GAAP financial statements 
(and obtaining audit, review, or compilation services) forces small 
and medium sized private entities (SMEs) to incur unnecessary 
costs. In this regard, the AICPA's FRF-SMEs purports to formally 
provide an alternative framework for preparing reliable non-GAAP 
financial statements that are efficient with qualitative attributes of 
objectivity, measurability, completeness and relevance.    
Whether all companies should comply with the same 
GAAP has been debated for years as users and preparers of 
financial statements have frequently called for a separate set of 
standards for relatively small companies.  Frequently in this 
debate, the two sets of standards option has been referred to as Big 
GAAP/Little GAAP (Burton et al. 1979; Burnie et al. 1987/1988; 
Grusd 2006; Thrower 2010; Wright et al. 2012). Thus, we cannot 
predict whether the demand for higher quality financial 
information by users and auditors as users’ agents will outweigh 
opportunistic behavior and other incentives for private companies.   
 
Tax Status of Companies 
In addition to ownership structure, the tax status of a 
company could influence the way management of a private 
company is motivated to manage earnings.  Private companies 
have more options when establishing their form of business entity 
than publicly-traded firms.  Almost all publicly-traded companies 
are formed in a C corporation status.   In contrast, only 5.7% of the 
companies that filed tax returns in 2008 with the Internal Revenue 
Service were C corporations (IRS 2011), indicating that a large 
proportion of non-public companies are not formed as C 
corporations.  Regular corporations (C corporations) pay separate 
income taxes at the corporate level; then dividends are taxed to 
owners when distributed.   
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Private companies also have the following options: 
individual ownership, incorporating as an S corporation or limited 
liability corporation (LLC), and forming as a limited liability 
partnership (LLP) or other form of partnership.  (The Sageworks 
database identifies the legal/organizational form of their 
observations.) Partnerships, LLPs, LLCs, and S Corps are usually 
pass-through entities that generally are not taxed at the entity level.  
The earnings of these entities are typically reported to owners, and 
included on their individual income tax returns to determine 
owners’ taxable income.   
Asker et al. (2011) found that different 
organizational/ownership structures of private companies did not 
appear to impact their investment behavior.  However, legal forms 
other than in the form of ‘C corporation’ can provide a tax benefit 
with respect to the combined tax liability of the business and its 
owners.  Consequently, private companies may have different 
incentives to try to increase or decrease income (by adjusting 
inventory levels) depending upon their tax status.  Privately-held 
audited, separately taxed companies are somewhat comparable to 
publicly-held companies. 
Because of potential effects of tax status on earnings 
management, we also examine privately-held taxable companies 
separate from privately-held pass-through companies.  Taxable 
companies are subjected to double taxation because their income 
is taxed at both the company level and at owners’ level (via 
dividends). Thus, managements of these companies could be 
motivated to underreport taxable income through managing 
production levels (e.g., overstating cost of goods sold and 
understating inventory). However, the more formally structured 
taxable private companies may have incentives to report higher 
incomes to make financial statements appealing to suppliers and 
lenders. 
While incomes of taxable companies are subjected to 
double taxation, incomes of pass-through companies are included 
in owners’ tax returns for determining taxes. As a result, owners’ 
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motivation to adjust production may vary depending on the 
circumstance dictated by owners’ overall tax burden based on 
taxable income consisting of owners’ income from the business 
and from other sources. Accordingly, managers can (i) manage 
production accrual to adjust reported income in the financial 
statements, or (ii) make adjustment in their tax return (based on 
income and/or losses from other activities) for determining taxable 
income without adjusting financial statements, or (iii) adjust both 
financial statements and tax returns.  
Further, companies (audited or reviewed) that are 
separately taxed are subjected to more scrutiny of tax auditors.  
(See IRS 2013.)  Therefore, it could be argued that financial 
statements of private companies that are separately taxed are likely 
to be more reliable than those of pass-through companies. 
However, tax authorities are likely to be more concerned with 
companies exhibiting negative abnormal production (reducing 
reported income and income taxes due) than those exhibiting 
positive abnormal production. Consequently, we present the 
following hypotheses (in the null form):  
 
H1: Public and private companies that are audited and taxable 
exhibit similar abnormal production. 
 
H2a: Private company financial statements that are audited-
taxable and those reviewed-taxable exhibit similar abnormal 
production. 
  
H2b: Private company financial statements that are audited pass-
through and those reviewed pass-through exhibit similar abnormal 
production. 
  
H3a: Private companies that are audited-taxable and those audited 
pass-through exhibit similar abnormal production. 
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H3b: Private companies that are reviewed-taxable and those 
reviewed pass-through exhibit similar abnormal production. 
 
Size of the Company 
Size of a company could influence behavior of public and private 
company management, which could affect QFAR. We address this 
possibility by limiting our sample overall to companies with sales 
between $1 million and $150 million.  However, even within this 
group of relatively small manufacturers (compared to most 
publicly traded manufacturers), a wide variation in size exists 
which could impact abnormal production levels.  For example, in a 
small owner-managed private company with relatively weak 
control over financial reporting, the owner-manager might be able 
to easily adjust production and inventory to achieve a desired level 
of taxable income. In contrast, a larger company with more 
effective internal control over financial reporting and subject to 
closer scrutiny by internal, external, and tax auditors might find it 
difficult to manipulate earnings. Also, relatively different sized 
companies could have different incentives to increase or decrease 
income.  As a result, we examine the following hypothesis (in the 
null form): 
H4: The size of public and private companies does not 
impact the level of abnormal production reported. 
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
 
Data 
This study examines the data from Sageworks 
Incorporated’s database, a proprietary source of private company 
information, and public information from the COMPUSTAT 
database.  The Sageworks Inc. private company database contains 
collected and assembled private company information to help 
accounting firms and banks compare data for individual companies 
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to a set of peer company data (Minnis 2011). The information 
comes from the clients of Sageworks’ customers/users who enter 
their clients’ financial statement information into the system.  
Information gathered from all of Sageworks customers' clients 
constitutes their private company data set. Sageworks offers 
customers/users access to summary statistics from this data set by 
subscription.   
The Sageworks data set includes income statement and 
balance sheet items, calculated ratios, some cash flow information, 
the level of assurance of the information (e.g., review, or audit), 
the private companies' industry (NAICS code), legal form, fiscal 
year-end, and state. However, the data set does not indicate: 
whether a company prepares statements in accordance with GAAP 
or another comprehensive basis of accounting (OCBOA), auditor 
name, opinion in the audit or review report issued, and whether 
GAAP departures, if any, are disclosed. Sageworks has accounting 
and programming specialists who work to maintain the integrity of 
information in the data set.  Sageworks briefly allowed researchers 
access to company-level data, with companies only identified by 
an ID number, but no longer makes its firm-level information 
available publicly.  
Table 1 summarizes the sample selection approach used, beginning 
with 423,631 observations for 2001 through 2008 in the Sageworks 
database.2  To examine our research questions in a focused context 
required production and inventory-related data of manufacturing 
companies. Accordingly, from this large data set we identified 
companies reporting sales in the manufacturing NAICS codes 
(311822 to 339999), which yielded 31,835 observations.  Years 
before 2005, contained substantially fewer observations with the 
necessary three years data for analysis than the later years. Earlier 
years therefore might be subject to selection bias because 
Sageworks had fewer subscribers during the data set start-up phase 
                                                 
2 The latest year used was 2008 because at the time the data set was obtained, 
complete data for 2009 was not available. 
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(Minnis 2011).  Consequently, observations prior to 2005 were 
omitted, leaving 24,307 observations. We discovered that several 
of these observations were duplicate annual observations or 
quarterly data; these we dropped, reducing the observations to 
20,542.   
 
Table 1 











with sales Total 
2001-2004 87,655 
 



























Less:  2001-2004 observations  7,528   
Total 2005-2008 observations 24,307   
 
Less duplicates and quarterly 3,765  
 
Observations from 2005-2008 20,542 11,678 32,220 
Less: Observations with < $1 million in 
sales1, or  > $150 million in sales, or missing 
variables.  13,089 7,416 20,505 
Less:   Sageworks observations whose data 
source was complied, company prepared, 
annualized, tax return, blank, or other. 2,604 _____ 2,604 
Usable Observations with all variables  4,849 4,262 9,111 
Less:  observations with < 15 observations in 
a year in 3-dig NAICS Code 38 72 110 
Sample for main analyses2 4,811 4,190 9,001 
1 Only 155 observations from the Sageworks data with sales from $100,000-
$1,000,000 had all necessary data for variables.  Most of these smaller companies 
did not have the required three years consecutively reported data. 
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2The sample included 2,451 separate Sageworks companies and 1,163 
COMPUSTAT companies. 
 
   Estimating abnormal production for an observation 
required companies to have data for three consecutive years.  We 
also restricted the sample to companies with sales of $1 million or 
greater because a small manipulation in inventory and production 
might have a magnified effect on income, and smaller companies 
may not have the same know-how or systems to manage earnings 
as larger companies. Further, there were only 155 Sageworks 
companies with sales less than $1 million that had sufficient data 
to be included in the analysis. These restrictions eliminated 
another 13,089 observations, most due to incomplete data.  Also, 
to restrict our analysis to observations in which accountants 
offered a reasonable degree of assurance (audit) or limited 
(review) assurance, we deleted 2,604 observations (related to 
compiled, company prepared, tax return, other or left blank) 
leaving 4,849 Sageworks observations for analyses.  
The COMPUSTAT sample also was collected from 
manufacturing companies (NAICS codes 311822 to 339999) for 
2005 through 2008 that reported sales for three consecutive years 
(11,678 observations).  To construct a sample comparable to 
Sageworks companies, those observations with sales more than the 
largest sales reported by a Sageworks observation ($150 million) 
or less than $1 million in sales were deleted.  This step eliminated 
7,416 COMPUSTAT observations, leaving 4,262.   
The abnormal production calculation required at least 14 
other observations from the same three-digit NAICS code for a 
year.  Consequently, companies from three-digit NAICS codes 
with few observations were deleted.  This led to the deletion of 38 
Sageworks observations and 72 COMPUSTAT observations.  
Thus, the full sample for the main analysis included 9,001 
observations (4,811 Sageworks + 4,190 COMPUSTAT) from 
3,614 separate companies (2,451 Sageworks + 1,163 
COMPUSTAT). 
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Observations from COMPUSTAT remained somewhat 
steady over the years examined, with slight declines from 2005 to 
2008.  In contrast, the number of Sageworks observations 
increased substantially from 2005 to 2006 and from 2006 to 2007; 
total observations were essentially the same for 2007 and 2008.  
The mix of Sageworks observations by level of assurance (audit 
and review) and tax status (pass-through and taxable) remained 
relatively stable from 2005 to 2008. 
Companies included in the sample came from a broad 
range of manufacturing industries, but were concentrated in a few 
industries. For example, over 40% of the COMPUSTAT 
observations came from computer and electronic product 
manufacturing companies and over 22% were companies in 
chemical manufacturing.  In contrast, for the private companies, 
only fabricated metal products and machinery manufacturing 
represented high percentages of total observations at 19% and 
15%, respectively.  The percentages of observations by three-digit 
NAICS codes were similar for the private company sample broken 




Within each three-digit NAICS code for each year, we use 
Roychowdhury (2006, 345) equation 4, and Cohen et al. (2008, 
766) equation 7, to estimate abnormal production.  Production is 
defined as the companies' cost of goods sold plus change in 
inventory for the year.  To estimate abnormal production, the 
following regression equation was run: 
(1)  PRODt,f/At-1,f = α0 + α1(1/ At-1,f) + α2(Salest,f/ At-1,f) + 
α3(Salechgt,f/ At,f) + α3(Salechgt-1,f/ At-1,f) + εt,f 
 
 where: PRODt,f = (cost of goods soldt,f + change in inventoryt,f) 
   At-1 = total assets at the beginning of the year,  
Salest = current year net sales,  
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Salechgt = change in sales during current year,  
Salechgt-1 = change in sales during previous year, and 
εt = the error term from the regression is abnormal 
production, Ab_Prodt; a positive Ab_Prodt would 
indicate the company increased reported income, 
whereas a negative Ab_Prodt indicates the company 
decreased reported income. 
 
Like Gunny (2010), we constructed variables to indicate 
companies that would most likely want to manage their incomes 
(for example, to avoid reporting a loss or avoiding reporting lower 
net income than that of the previous year):  (1) MEET_0 = 1 if net 
income scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year was 
greater than or equal to zero, but less than 0.01, (2) MEET_last = 1 
if net income of the current year scaled by net income of the 
previous year was greater than or equal to zero, but less than 0.01, 
and (3) any observations falling within these categories are 
considered to have the greatest incentive/likelihood of engaging in 
earnings management to increase income and consequently were 
coded as BENCH = 1.   
We constructed a formula similar to that used by Gunny 
(2010) to test whether those companies most likely to manage 
income exhibited different Ab_Prodt than others: 
(2)      Ab_Prodt = α0 + α1(BENCHt) + α2(Size_lnAt-1) + α3(ROAt) 
+ α6(Industryf ) + α7(Yearg) + εt 
 
where: Ab_Prodt was defined as the residual from Equation 1    
above, 
  BENCHt was defined in the previous paragraph,  
Size_lnAt-1 = the natural log of total assets at the beginning 
of the year,  
ROAt = income before extraordinary items divided by total 
assets at the beginning of the year, 
Industryf = 1 if company is in industry f (based on 3-digit 
NAICS codes), 0 otherwise, and 
Journal of Accounting, Ethics & Public Policy 
Volume 17, No. 3 (2016) 
 
649 
Yearg = 1 if the observation is from year g, 0 otherwise.  
 
Descriptive Statistics and Preliminary Analyses to Address 
Hypotheses 1, 2a, 2b, 3a, and 3b 
 
Table 2 provides the means for public (COMPUSTAT) 
companies and Sageworks companies (by level of assurance and 
organization tax status) for variables from Equations 1 and 2 and 
the residual from Equation 1, the abnormal production measure.  
Some differences between the groups are evident based on means 
shown in Table 2.  The means of PRODt, one_At-1, Salest, salechgt, 
salechgt-1, BENCHt, ROAt, and Ab_Prodt appear quite a bit lower 
for public companies than for private companies.  In contrast, 
Size_lnATt appears much higher for public companies than for 
private companies.  Also, means for Ab_Prodt of private 
companies appear to vary somewhat by tax status.   
 To help examine Hypotheses 1, 2a, 2b, 3a, and 3b we 
calculated Z-test statistics for Ab_Prodt  = 0 for the various sample 
groups.  For the subsamples, only the publicly traded companies, 
with a negative Ab_Prodt (mean = -0.012), and the private audited-
taxed group, with a positive Ab_Prodt (mean = 0.026), exhibited 
significant Z-test scores.  The opposite signs on the means of the 
groups and the significant Z-tests provide evidence to support 
rejection of null Hypothesis 1 (relating to abnormal production of 
comparable public versus private audited-taxable companies), 
indicating that abnormal production exhibited by public companies 
differs from that exhibited by private companies that are audited 
and taxable.   
While Ab_Prodt of privately-owned audited-taxable 
companies is significant, the means for the other private company 
subgroups generate nonsignificant Z-test statistics.  This indicates 
differences between Ab_Prodt of privately-owned audited-taxable 
companies and the other groups.  These differences provide some 
evidence to reject Hypotheses 2a and 3a, in that Ab_Prodt of 
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privately-owned audited-taxable companies differ from both the 
privately-owned reviewed-taxable and audited pass-through 





Descriptive Statistics of Variables for the Full 
Sample and Various Subsamples 
 
Panel A:  Full, COMPUSTAT, and All Private companies 
samples 
 All COMPUSTAT All Private 
Variable          N= 9001 4190 4811 
PROD_A_t_1 1.275 0.710 1.767 
 
1.029 0.712 1.010 
one_A_t_1 0.228 0.101 0.339 
 
0.350 0.250 0.386 
Sale_A_t_1 1.773 1.038 2.413 
 
1.268 0.899 1.193 
salechg_A_t_1 0.156 0.106 0.199 
 
0.501 0.419 0.559 
salechg_1_A_t_1 0.129 0.072 0.180 
 
0.404 0.335 0.450 
BENCHt 0.089 0.060 0.113 
 
0.284 0.238 0.317 
Size_ln_TA 2.448 3.405 1.615 
 
1.495 1.327 1.076 
ROAt -0.067 -0.243 0.086 
 
0.433 0.534 0.230 
AB_PROD -0.0031 -0.012 0.006 
 
0.318 0.313 0.322 
Means and (standard deviations)    
1Windsorizing results in AB_PROD mean slightly different from zero. 
AB_PROD = 0  
(2-tailed Z test)  -0.756 -2.489** 1.237 






















Variable          N= 837 801 1393 1780 
PROD_A_t_1 1.492 1.732 1.743 1.931 
 
0.854 1.025 1.001 1.047 
one_A_t_1 0.193 0.180 0.458 0.387 
 
0.284 0.231 0.444 0.389 
Sale_A_t_1 2.026 2.352 2.394 2.636 
 
0.984 1.174 1.164 1.263 
salechg_A_t_1 0.206 0.217 0.161 0.217 
 
0.482 0.555 0.545 0.602 
salechg_1_A_t_1 0.164 0.201 0.144 0.205 
 
0.402 0.450 0.461 0.462 
BENCHt 0.134 0.081 0.150 0.089 
 
0.341 0.273 0.357 0.285 
Size_ln_TA 2.230 2.223 1.187 1.388 
 
1.063 0.995 0.925 0.971 
ROAt 0.025 0.114 0.047 0.132 
 
0.269 0.279 0.129 0.236 
AB_PROD 0.026 -0.016 0.012 0.001 
 
0.301 0.345 0.311 0.328 
Means and (standard deviations)    
 
AB_PROD = 0 
(two-tailed Z 
test)` 2.499** -1.313 1.440 0.129 
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**,***--Significant at .05 and .01, respectively.   
Variable Definitions: 
PROD_A_t_1 = (cost of goods soldt,f + change in inventoryt,f)/total assets at the 
beginning of the year. 
one_A_t_1 = 1/total assets at the beginning of the year. 
Sale_A_t_1 = current year net sales/total assets at the beginning of the year.  
salechg_A_t_1 = change in sales during current year /total assets at the 
beginning of the year. 
salechg_1_A_t_1 = change in sales during previous year /total assets at the 
beginning of the year. 
BENCHt = 1 if net income scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year 
was greater than or equal to zero, but less than 0.01, or MEET   if net 
income of the current year scaled by net income of the previous year was 
greater than or equal to zero, but less than 0.01, else 0. 
Size_ln_TA = the natural log of total assets at the beginning of the year. 
ROAt = income before extraordinary items divided by total assets at the 
beginning of the year. 





company groups.  Nonsignificant Z tests on Ab_Prodt for the 
audited pass-through, reviewed-taxable, and reviewed pass-through 
companies provide no support to reject Hypotheses 2b and 3b.  
 
Analyses of Abnormal Production for Companies Most Likely 
to Manage Earnings and the Impact of Size on Abnormal 
Production 
 
Our abnormal production measure, constructed by the error 
term from a regression model (1) of expected production, could 
result from factors other than intentional manipulation. Abnormal 
production could be caused by an omitted variable or capture an 
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efficient management decision (Gunny 2010).  Accordingly, we 
also analyzed the data and tested the hypotheses for a context 
where a strong likelihood of earnings management exists.  As 
described above, following Gunny (2010), we constructed an 
indicator variable (BENCH) for companies that meet the 
benchmarks of just meeting or barely exceeding zero net income, 
or their previous years' income.   Like Gunny (2010, 871), we also 
included the log of total assets to control for size effects, and ROA 
because real earnings management may be correlated with 
performance.  Our Equation 2 differs from Gunny in that we do not 
include a market to book value variable to control for growth 
opportunities because our sample includes privately owned 
companies for which market value is unknown.  (Gunny also 
multiplied her abnormal production measure by -1, leading to 
reversing the signs on their reported parameter estimates.)   
Motivations to manage earnings may differ between 
different sized companies even within these relatively small 
manufacturing companies -- particularly when considering private 
companies (with differing tax statuses) compared to public 
companies.  Because the overall size restriction for inclusion in our 
sample was based on sales from $1 to $150 million, we add 
indicator variables for size based on sales.   For manufacturing 
companies, differences in sales may be better indications of size 
differences than differences in total assets; differing depreciation 
methods and differing ages of assets could lead to wider variation 
in a measure of total assets than a measure of variation in sales. 
We add two variables for size to Equation 2 to construct Equation 
2a which is used to test our hypotheses:   
(2a)  Ab_Prodt = α0 + α1(BENCHt) + α2(Size_lnAt-1) + α3(ROAt) 
+ α4(Sales_quint_lowt) + α5(Sales_quint_hight) + εt 
where: Ab_Prodt, BENCHt, Size_lnAt-1, and ROAt were defined 
above,  
Sales_quint_lowt = 1, if the observation falls in the lowest 
quintile of sales for the full sample, 0 otherwise, and   
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Sales_quint_hight = 1, if the observation falls in the highest 
quintile of sales for the full sample, 0 otherwise. 
 
Table 3 shows the results from regression analyses based on 




Cross-sectional Regressions Relating Abnormal Production to 
Companies Just Meeting Zero or Previous Year’s Earnings 
 
Panel A:  Full, COMPUSTAT, and All Private companies samples 
 
All COMPUSTAT All Private 
          Variable        N= 9001 4190 4811 
Intercept -0.005 -0.149 0.042 
 
-0.50 -6.43*** 2.61*** 
BENCHt 0.031 0.030 0.003 
 
2.94*** 1.84* 0.21 
Size_ln_TA -0.003 0.034 -0.004 
 
-0.70 5.34*** -0.68 
ROAt -0.157 -0.145 -0.388 
 
-11.01*** -8.42*** -8.86*** 
Sales_quint_low -0.011 0.045 -0.027 
 
-0.97 2.57*** -1.78* 
Sales_quint_high -0.012 -0.068 0.128 
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 -1.14 -5.58*** 6.86*** 




















Variable         N= 837 801 1393 1780 
Intercept -0.038 -0.013 0.095 0.067 
 
-0.94 -0.27 3.80*** 2.55** 
BENCHt 0.043 0.031 -0.019 -0.009 
 
1.74* 0.90 -0.84 -0.34 
Size_ln_TA 0.025 0.013 -0.035 -0.001 
 
1.65* 0.70 -2.90*** -0.11 
ROAt -0.220 -0.429 -0.565 -0.455 
 
-2.32** -4.52*** -6.41*** -7.27*** 
Sales_quint_low 0.029 -0.161 -0.041 -0.041 
 
0.63 -2.79*** -1.70* -1.77* 
Sales_quint_high 0.026 0.150 0.157 0.174 
 0.80 3.99*** 2.71*** 4.47*** 
Adjusted R2 0.041 0.158 0.053 0.115 
 
**,***--Significant at .05 and .01, respectively.   
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Parameter estimates and t-statistics for independent variables from Gunny 
(2010), less market to book value, plus variables for highest and lowest sales 
quintiles. 
Gunny (2010) found an insignificant impact for ROA on 
Ab_Prodt, while we found a negative and significant coefficient for 
ROA overall and in all subgroups.  The impact of ROA may be 
more pronounced for our relatively small manufacturing company 
sample compared to the public company sample from all industries 
included in Gunny’s analysis.  For our overall sample, the 
coefficient for BENCH was positive and significant, like Gunny’s 
(2010, 872), indicating that companies just meeting earnings 
benchmarks were more likely to have increased production.  
BENCH was significant for the public (COMPUSTAT) 
subsample, suggesting that public companies are likely to engage 
in managing production activities to manage earnings. Within 
privately-held companies, while BENCH for audited-taxable 
companies was positive and significant, BENCH was insignificant 
for all other privately-held groups, indicating that privately-held 
audited-taxable companies are also likely to engage in production 
management to manage earnings. Further, BENCH for the 
privately-held audited pass-through group is positive (0.031) 
though not significant, whereas BENCH for reviewed taxable and 
pass-through subsamples are negative and insignificant.  
These results suggest that audited public and audited 
private-taxable companies (with positive BENCH) might manage 
earnings by managing production activities to satisfy financial 
statement users. In contrast, we find no evidence of earnings 
management related to BENCH for reviewed-companies. The 
significance on BENCH for audited public and private-taxable 
companies may result from closer auditor scrutiny which might 
prevent audited companies from managing other accruals. 
Consequently, audited-taxable companies may be more likely to 
engage in earnings management through production and inventory 
decisions. Possibly, reviewed companies could manage earnings 
through other accruals. Also, users of reviewed financial 
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statements may have access to all desired information about the 
company, whereas users of audited companies might be more 
dispersed, requiring the services of an external auditor as their 
agent.       
The coefficients on Size_lnAt-1, Sales_quint_lowt and 
Sales_quint_hight reported in Table 3 show the impact of size on 
abnormal production for the overall sample and various 
subsamples.  In line with Gunny’s (2010) results, the coefficient 
for Size_lnAt-1 is positive and significant for public companies.  
Within privately-held companies, Size_lnAt-1 is: (1) positive and 
significant for the audited-taxable group, and positive but 
insignificant for audited pass-through, (2) negative and significant 
for the reviewed-taxable subsample, and negative but insignificant 
for reviewed pass-through subsample. These results indicate that 
asset-size does impact Ab_Prodt of privately-held companies 
differently in various subgroups. Further, BENCH and asset size 
appear to impact Ab_Prodt in similar directions.  
As indicated above, Table 3 also includes the effect of size 
(based on sales) on Ab_Prodt.  Sales_quint_lowt and 
Sales_quint_hight for the subgroups reveal an interesting size 
effect.  Public companies in the lowest sales quintile exhibit 
significantly higher/positive Ab_Prodt, while public companies in 
the highest sales quintile exhibit significantly lower Ab_Prodt. In 
contrast, private companies collectively (n=4811) exhibit the 
opposite size effect: the full private sample and all private 
company subsamples except the audited-taxable subsample, 
exhibit significantly lower abnormal production in 
Sales_quint_lowt, and significantly higher abnormal production in 
Sales_quint_hight. These results provide support for rejecting 
Hypothesis 4, because size (based on both assets and sales 
revenue) does influence abnormal production.3     
                                                 
3We extended our analyses on the effects of size on Ab_Prodt because 
Size_lnAt-1, Sales_quint_lowt, and Sales_quint_hight are correlated. 
Accordingly, we adjusted Equation 2 by excluding the variable Size_lnAt-
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Results reported in Table 3 reveal that the impact on 
Ab_Prodt of Sales_quint_high and Sales_quint_lowt differs 
between public companies and all (n=4811) privately-held 
companies. These differences hold in almost all cases for private 
company subgroups. The differences in the signs on 
Sales_quint_hight and Sales_quint_lowt within the samples provide 
strong evidence to reject Hypothesis 4, that size does not impact 
abnormal production.  These results should warrant caution by 
researchers when comparing real earnings management of private 
companies and public companies, or when using a combined 
sample of private and public companies to draw inferences. 
 
IV. LIMITATIONS AND AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
Kvaal et al. (2012) found that the real earnings 
management behavior of family-owned private firms tend to be 
different from nonfamily-owned private firms.  We could not 
address this issue due to lack of ownership information in the 
Sageworks database.  Prior studies have also indicated that the 
quality of financial reporting may vary depending upon auditor 
size. We did not have information regarding either which public 
accounting firm performed the audit or the type of independent 
accountant opinion related to private company financial 
statements.   
Due to data limitations in our Sageworks private company 
sample we restricted our sample to manufacturing companies and 
focused on inventory and production activities management.  
Differences in earnings management between public and private 
companies in industries other than manufacturing, through 
measures other than production and inventory decisions could be 
                                                                                                             
1 and rerunning the analyses. In this additional analysis, results for 
BENCH conform closely with those in Table 3 and results for the sales 
size variables differ only slightly from those reported in Table 3.  
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even wider and more unpredictable due to complexity of 
accounting regulations (such as accounting for fair values).  
However, as recognized by the FRF-SME task force and BRP 
Panel, some of these reporting requirements could be irrelevant to 
most users of most private company financial statements. 
Limitations suggest future avenues for research.  Samples 
with more detailed ownership information related to private firms 
could allow examination of differences between family-owned 
versus nonfamily-owned private companies as found by Kvaal 
(2012).  A sample with more detailed auditor and audit opinion 
information for private companies would allow examination of 
whether auditor size and auditor opinion affect the quality of 
financial reporting by private companies.  Also, a larger sample 
would allow an investigation of the effects of other potential 
earnings management methods. 
 
V.   SUMMARY OF RESULTS AND DISCUSSION OF 
IMPLICATIONS 
For our sample of relatively small public manufacturing 
companies (with sales ranging between $1 & $150 million) the 
demand for high-quality information apparently leads to significant 
negative abnormal production overall (Table 2); particularly, 
public companies in the largest sales quintile of our sample tend to 
manage production to decrease reported earnings (Table 3). This 
could be due to closer auditor scrutiny to comply with PCAOB 
standards and possible PCAOB inspection of larger audits. 
However, the potential for opportunistic behavior by managers of 
public companies may also explain some results: public companies 
are likely to manage production to increase reported earnings to 
just meet certain benchmarks (Table 3).  
 Results from our privately-owned company sample indicate 
a more complex relationship between abnormal production and 
company characteristics than that for publicly traded companies.  
Overall, audited-taxable companies exhibit significant positive 
abnormal production (Table 2), suggesting audited taxable 
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companies are more likely to use production and inventory 
decisions to increase earnings, and less likely to understate income 
(e.g., to minimize tax liability) than companies in other subgroups. 
Further, audited-taxable companies in the highest and lowest 
quintiles do not exhibit significantly different abnormal 
production, suggesting that size differences among the audited-
taxable companies do not impact production and inventory 
decisions (Table 3).   
In contrast, while private companies in other groups 
(audited pass-through, reviewed-taxable and pass-through) do not 
exhibit overall significant abnormal production (Table 2), they 
exhibit significantly higher (lower) abnormal production in the 
highest (lowest) quintiles (Table 3).  These outcomes may arise 
from conflicting incentives for these companies, influenced by 
size.  Reviewed-taxable, and audited and reviewed pass-through 
companies may experience lower demand for high-quality 
information, (perhaps due to less complex ownership structures).  
Opportunistic behavior by managers (to obtain personal 
compensation or external financing for the company) in these three 
groups of private companies (audited pass-through, reviewed-
taxable and reviewed pass-through) could explain the significant 
positive abnormal production in the largest quintile.   
However, the potential for opportunistic behavior for tax 
avoidance by managers of private companies in the smallest 
quintile may also explain the significantly negative abnormal 
production exhibited by these three groups of private companies.  
Collectively these results suggest that, in some accounting 
contexts, financial information from private companies that are 
audited-taxable should be analyzed separately from other private 
companies. Also, taxing authorities might want to more carefully 
examine reported inventories from private companies (particularly 
small ones) that could be motivated to manage earnings downward 
to minimize tax burden. 
 Results reported in Table 3, provide strong evidence that 
abnormal production of private and publicly owned manufacturing 
Foster, Mueller & Shastri: Production Management by Manufacturers  
 
636 
companies differs depending upon their relative size. Further, 
public and private-taxable audited companies might rely more on 
managing production activities to meet certain earnings 
benchmarks, rather than managing other accruals, because of audit 
scrutiny. These results suggest caution when research findings and 
recommendations from studies examining only publicly traded 
companies are extrapolated to private companies.  
Our results reveal significant differences in management of 
production activities between public and private manufacturing 
companies, and between audited-taxable private manufacturing 
companies and other private manufacturing company groups.  
Differences between public and private companies' accounting 
methods, ownership structure, and/or incentives to manage 
earnings lend credence to Big GAAP/Little GAAP advocates.  
Current accounting regulations are mainly based on a one-GAAP 
philosophy focusing on public company user needs.  These 
regulations may not satisfy the needs of private company financial 
statement users.   
The FRF-SME task force observed that, compared to 
publicly traded companies, small owner-managed businesses have 
different financial statement users with varying informational 
needs and that many key users of SMEs’ financial statements have 
direct access to the entity’s management. Consequently, 
information asymmetry/gap between preparers and users of 
financial information is likely to be smaller for private companies 
compared to those of public companies.  
According to the Blue Ribbon Panel (BRP) Report (2011), 
private companies, under current practice in the United States, 
may report under U.S. GAAP or some Other Comprehensive Basis 
of Accounting (OCBOA). Consequently, an increasing number of 
private company financial statements are prepared in accordance 
with OCBOA (usually cash or tax basis) or sometimes depart from 
U.S. GAAP with such departures disclosed in the accountant's or 
auditor's report (Hilmi et al. 2012).  The BRP Report points out 
that the current accounting standards setting process has not 
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evaluated and addressed the information needs of users of private 
companies and how their information needs differ from those of 
users of public company financial statements.  
Our results support the BRP conclusion that urgent and 
growing systemic issues need to be addressed in the current system 
of U.S. accounting standard setting.  Any new accounting 
standard-setting system should seek to maintain a high degree of 
financial reporting comparability for business entities, regardless 
of their ownership structure. The BRP recommended establishing, 
under the oversight of Financial Accounting Foundation, a separate 
private company standards board to help ensure appropriate and 
sufficient exceptions and modifications are made for both new and 
existing standards. The AICPA (2013) FRF-SME task force report 
provides a non-GAAP framework as an alternative to GAAP for 
small and medium sized entities. This non-GAAP framework 
might, to some extent, address the BRP’s concerns about the 
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